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11 Introduction
Political economy has for long studied the effects of political representation (ide-
ologies and the identity of governing party) on the amount and composition of
public spending.1 More recently, building on the theoretical work of Downs
(1957), Alesina (1998) and Besley and Coate (1997), interest has centered on the
causal effects of political partisanship on political outcomes (e.g. Petterson-
Lidbom 2008) and on whether voters affect policies or choose political platforms
(Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2006, Ferreira and Gyourko 2008). This paper focuses
on the question of how political representation affects how public services are
procured.
The reason for this focus is that public procurement constitutes a large -
15% by OECD estimates (OECD, 2005) - and increasing part of economic activ-
ity. While there is a growing empirical literature on procurements and procure-
ment auctions (e.g. Marion 2007, Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2007), the political
aspects of procurement decisions have to the best of our knowledge not been ana-
lyzed  empirically  before.  We offer  such  an  analysis  by  asking  how the  political
identity of the governing party affects whether or not to procure a given service or
good, and if, how to procure it. To this end, we focus on the following questions:
Which municipalities procure; whether conditional on procuring, the procurement
has open or restricted (by-invitation-only) entry; and conditional on having re-
stricted entry, how many firms are invited. We then turn utilizing the relative
strength of our data – information on the bids and municipal choices – and ana-
lyze the question of what determines whose bid gets chosen.
1 See e.g. section 6 of Besley and Case (2003). Besley and Case report, for example, that Democ-
ratic governors in the US increase spending on state workers’ compensation programs by 2$ per
capita.
2Our aim is to contribute to the literature by studying public procurement
auctions of a clearly defined low-tech product, (internal) cleaning service con-
tracts, using data from Swedish municipalities in the 1990s. We have chosen
cleaning services because of their very simple production process that should
make them amenable to being procured. The service is simple to contract on and,
as we will demonstrate, does not vary much in (unobserved) quality.2 For the
same reason, there should be relatively little reason to depart from standard auc-
tion formats, and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder.
Sweden provides a good testing ground for us for two primary reasons.
First, it has been argued that despite a multiparty structure, there is a natural divi-
sion into right- and left-wing in Swedish politics that matters for policy outcomes
(e.g. Aronsson and Wikström 1996, Dahlberg and Johansson 2002, Pettersson-
Lidbom 2001, 2008, and Hanes 2007): Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds, for ex-
ample, that Swedish right-wing local governments accumulate more debt than
left-wing ones if they are certain to be replaced.3 It has also been documented that
the Swedish left-wing municipalities spend and tax 2-3 percent more than the
right-wing local governments and appear to care more about and be able to influ-
ence local unemployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). second reason why Sweden
provides a good testing ground for us is that it applied the EU procurement law.
As such the general principles of our research questions are of interest for all
countries applying the EU directives. Interestingly, the EU directives of that time
municipalities high degrees of freedom in organizing procurements. Although the
2 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement and
stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and con-
tractual design incomplete. In our case, exactly opposite holds: Objects are simple and contractual
design complete (at least when compared to the procurement of aircrafts and the like).
3 Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find that the central government distributes grants to areas where
there are many swing voters. They do not study the effect of the identity of the party in power on
this (presumable because there have been so few changes in central government in Sweden).
3directives of today are much sharper in many dimensions they are not in the as-
signment rules, the questions posted in this paper are thereby still valid.4
In terms of methodology, we build on the important papers by Lee, Moretti
and Butler (2008), Lee (2008) and Petterson-Lidbom (2008) who outline a regres-
sion discontinuity approach to studying the causal effects of political partisanship.
The idea, clearly exposited in Lee (2008), is that comparing outcomes in munici-
palities where the left-wing party barely won to outcomes in municipalities where
it barely lost allows one to identify the pure party effect on outcomes. We utilize
this approach in studying who procures, type of entry, and how many firms are
invited.
We find that the propensity to procure cleaning services is not affected by
the political identity of the governing party. Conditional on procuring, every mu-
nicipality grabbed the freedom allowed by the law, as no municipality committed
to a standard (price) auction format of any kind. Nor did any municipality choose
to have an explicit scoring rule. We find that entry was restricted for 30% of the
time  and  that  the  political  identity  of  the  governing  party  is  not  correlated  with
organizing an auction with restricted entry. These results are, on the one hand, in
line with those of Ferreira and Gyourko (2008) who study U.S. mayoral elections
and who find no partisan effects. On the other hand, our results offer an interest-
ing contrast to Petterson-Lidbom who finds that Swedish left-wing municipal gov-
ernments tax 2-3 percent more than right-wing municipal governments, and that
they employ 4 percent more workers. Given his results, one would have expected
that left-wing majority councils would be less likely to procure public services.
More in line with Petterson-Lidbom, we find that conditional on organizing an
4 Public procurement continues to create controversy in Sweden even today: One of the leading
Swedish daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, has in 2007 had several articles on the functioning of
4auction with restricted entry, the number of firms invited to bid does vary with
political identity, with a left-wing majority in the council leading to fewer firms
being invited.
To utilize the rich bid level data at our disposal, we resort to a standard dis-
crete choice framework. As we observe several bids for every object (premises)
for which cleaning services are procured, we can condition all additive object /
auction / municipality unobservables. We then study how the identity of the ruling
party affects the price sensitivity of the municipality, and the revealed preferences
for bidder type, keeping the bids constant.
Municipalities grabbed the freedom allowed by the law to choose the winner
on the basis of “best economic value”, but appear to have left its contents com-
pletely undefined. Probably as a result of this, the lowest bidder does not win 58%
of the time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the municipalities end
up paying on average 43% more than the lowest bid. In the raw data, the probabil-
ity of the lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%) in municipalities with right-
wing (left-wing) councils, and the difference is significant at 1% level. This result
on the role of the governing party identity is confirmed when we apply the stan-
dard random utility framework to study the bureaucrat behavior (pioneered by
McFadden 1975, 1976): Our bid level analysis of which bid gets chosen shows
that while all councils are price sensitive, the councils with left-wing majority are
1.5 times as price sensitive as the right-wing councils. In these estimations we
control for unobserved heterogeneity, such as municipal and object (e.g. the
and alleged misconduct in public procurement.
5school which is to be cleaned) level unobservables. We find no systematic evi-
dence of bids being endogenous.5
These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and
provision of services. There is a long history of patronage in government contracts
with private firms, and market-oriented procurement is often advocated as a
means to block political concerns out of the process of providing public services.
Our findings cast some doubt on this view. Our findings also have implications
for the economics literature on procurement auctions. We document that bureau-
crat behavior and incentives matter in public procurement, especially in auctions
in which the non-price attributes of bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of
the award decision. We observe that the political identity of the governing party
matters at micro-level, i.e., at the level of individual auction outcomes. This is not
consistent with what is typically assumed in the literature on procurement auc-
tions nor with parties preferring similar procurement (policy) outcomes in equilib-
rium (as predicted e.g. by strict convergence in the classical median voter mod-
els).
In the following section, we describe in detail the legal and institutional
environment, the product(s) (i.e., the objects of bidding) and the data. In section
three we present our results on the first three questions. Section four is devoted to
studying the choice behavior of municipalities. To this end we develop a random
utility model of choosing the winning bid. We discuss our results in section five,
and offer conclusions in section six.
5 While our object – procurement auctions – necessarily makes the well developed and large auc-
tion literature relevant for us, we consciously have chosen to study questions that allow us to not
take a stand on the issues at the heart of that literature: information of bidders, bidder types, and
bidder strategies. The reason for this is simple: The complete freedom allowed by the Swedish
procurement rules means that it seems impossible or at least extremely challenging to write down
a (structural) auction model that would capture the essence of the environment in which the Swed-
ish firms made participation and bidding decisions.
62 Institutional environment and data
2.1 Institutional environment and procurement law
Our data come from the period 1990-1998, and more than 90% of the data is from
the latter half of the period. During the latter half, public procurement in Sweden
was governed by the Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992:1528). While the law
was not yet in force in 1990-1993, the rules that applied then were essentially the
same as under the Public Procurement Act. This law specified the environment in
which the Swedish municipalities and bidding firms acted and was based on the
(then-prevailing) EU directives.
From the  point  of  view of  this  paper  the  following  features  of  the  law are
central: First, the municipalities were allowed to freely choose whether to procure
or to produce in-house.6 Conditional on deciding to procure, the law allowed them
to decide whether to allow open entry or not.  As for the mode of entry,  the law
allowed for four types of procurement mechanisms.7 The main difference between
these is that two (Simplified, Open) allowed free entry while two (Restricted, Ne-
gotiated8) did not. Conditional on restricting entry, the law allowed the munici-
palities to decide how many (and which firms) to invite.
6 We take municipalities’ decisions about the number of cleaning service contracts that they pro-
cured, as well as their characteristics, as given. It is of course entirely possible that some munici-
palities decided to procure cleaning services for, say, some of their schools while keeping the
cleaning of others in-house. For a study of the behavior and market orientation of the municipali-
ties of a neighboring Scandinavian country (Denmark), see Christoffersen and Paldam (2003).
7 The law specified a threshold value of procurement (200 000€), below which Simplified and
Direct were allowed, and above which Open, Restricted or Negotiated were required. The question
if procurement mechanisms with restricted entry can be empirically motivated with high imple-
mentation costs is analyzed in Lundberg (2005). Using the same data as in the present paper
Lundberg finds no evidence of such relation.
8 While negotiations were allowed in Simplified and Negotiated procurements (see chapter 5,
“Procurement of services”, in the Public Procurement Act, LOU 1992:1528), they were not used in
the procurements that we study.
7Second, while the law allowed a municipality to arrange simultaneous pro-
curements (procurement auctions), combinatorial bidding was not applied (i.e.,
the procurement rules instructed firms to submit one bid per object and the mu-
nicipality should accordingly have made decisions “object-by-object”). Third,
only sealed bids were allowed. Fourth, the lowest bidder should have won. Fi-
nally, there was an exception to the “lowest bid wins” -rule: A municipality had
the freedom to deem that some other bid was “most advantageous economically”
when quality, environmental aspects, service and maintenance etc. were also
taken into account. The law did not force municipalities to use any explicit scor-
ing rules.9 Nor did it mention for example the locality of the bidder as an allow-
able dimension, but seems not to have ruled it out either. Under the current rules,
it is illegal.
It is illustrative of the atmosphere of the time that the freedom allowed by the
law to deviate from choosing the lowest bid was seen as beneficial. The following
quote from a book by a public sector lawyer testifies to this:
“The tender having the lowest price offered should be accepted.  If it has
been stated in the advertisement that the most economically advantageous
tender will be accepted, factors specified therein can be taken into consid-
eration in the assessment of tenders. The factors can be stated according to
a degree of priority (LOU 1 ch. 22§), however this is not a requirement. On
the contrary, it can be advantageous to state in the advertisement that such
factors are non-prioritized, since this increases the possibility of being able
to choose the contractor.”  (Löfving 1994, pp. 65; our translation and
italics).
9 This has changed after our observation period, partly because of EU wide directives that dictate
that as a general rule, explicit scoring has to be used. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the  clear  purpose  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act  of  1992  was  that  if  the  lowest  bidder  is  not
awarded the contract, this has to be because along some well-specified (and ex ante notified) di-
mensions, some higher bid is “more economically advantageous”.
8Besides the lax procurement law, an important aspect of the institutional
environment is that we study decision making by Swedish municipalities in which
a large fraction of the production of public services of the Swedish welfare state is
done. This means, first, that they operate within a homogenous and common po-
litical framework. Second, decision making is delegated: The principals are the
inhabitants of the municipality and the agent the municipal council (or more con-
cretely, the civil servants working under the council’s management, e.g., the per-
sonnel of municipal procurement units/offices). Third, the members of Swedish
councils are members of political parties and the political system can be character-
ized, at least to a first approximation, bipartisan (see, e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom
2008). Finally, the decision making in the Swedish councils is influenced by po-
litical bargaining and thinking, making the design and award decisions in public
procurement auctions subject to political ideology considerations.
While the models of Alesina (1998) and Besley and Coate (1997) provide
an explanation for political partisanship, neither the prior political economy and
science literature, nor the literature on public procurement, gives clear-cut predic-
tions on the effect of political representation on procurement policies, except per-
haps on the decision on whether or not to procure in the first place. The available
evidence from Sweden suggests that when in control, the left-wing majority coun-
cils of Swedish municipalities employ systematically more government workers
and are thereby able to influence local unemployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008).
In our context, this political preference may result in a reduced likelihood to pro-
cure.
As the theoretical predictions are either lacking or mixed, it is an empirical
matter to determine whether left-wing or right-wing majority councils prefer more
9open entry or if entry is restricted, invite more bidders (or particular types of bid-
ders), and how the parties weight price when choosing the winner.
2.2 Description of the data
Our bidding and procurement data come from a survey, administered to all Swed-
ish municipalities asking them for procurement documents regarding internal
cleaning services. The documents are contract notice, technical specification, list
of bidders, bids, and the decision protocol stating the winner of the contract. The
response rate was 79.5 percent. We don’t know if all the Swedish municipalities
that organized procurement auctions in cleaning services are in our data: 59 of the
229 municipalities that replied to the survey organized at least one procurement
auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. We have supplemented this data with
municipality characteristics, obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).
A first look at the documents show that though the non-price criteria, if any,
should have been posted in advance, the weight attached to each criterion in the
evaluation was unknown to the bidders prior to the bidding.10 In other words, mu-
nicipalities did not use any explicit scoring rules during our observation period.
Our hands-on analysis of the procurement documentation shows that conditional
on procuring, every municipality grabbed the freedom allowed by the law, as no
municipality opted for and committed to a standard (price) auction format of any
kind. Nor did any municipality choose to have an explicit scoring rule.
Table 1 describes how the procurements in our data are organized. Pro-
curement is an instance where a municipality purchases cleaning services for one
or more “objects” through a joint procurement procedure. The objects are the
premises to be cleaned and the bidders are Swedish firms. This feature of the data
10
means that the event of procurement can consist of one or more “auctions”. While
a separate, non-combinatorial auction is run for each object, there is an element of
sealed, pay-your-bid “multi-object auctions” to these procurements. As the col-
umn titled “All” shows, the number of procurements in our data is 131 and the
total number objects is 758, of which 721 are included in our analysis.11 The num-
ber of objects per procurement varies from one (single-unit) to 74, and the number
of bids per object from one to 37. Some 50 objects obtain at most 3 bids, half the
objects 4-7 bids, and another 200 8-11 bids. We observe a total of 5926 bids. The
frequency at which the various procurement mechanisms were used is also re-
ported. Entry was open (i.e., classified either open or simplified in the table) in
70% of the procurements.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 also describes the municipalities who organize the procurements. We
have data (as of the date of the procurement) on the unemployment rate (unempm),
population (populm), population density (popdensm), average income (incomem),
share of inhabitants having a higher education (highedum) and a measure of politi-
cal ideology. Following earlier work with Swedish municipal level data (e.g.
Aronsson and Wikström 1996), our measure of political ideology is council com-
position. We define redm to be an indicator for the median voter of council m, i.e.,
it is equal to one if there is a left-wing majority (redpropm > 50%) and zero oth-
erwise.12 This indicator captures the fact that party control changes discontinu-
ously at 50 percent of the vote share (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) and is a parsimo-
10 An example of a typical contract notice is found in Appendix A.
11 The remaining 37 contracts are excluded from the analysis, because there was one procurement
in which each contract had multiple winners (i.e., the contracts were “framework agreements”).
12 Following earlier work, we categorize as leftwing council members those belonging to either the
Left Party or the Social Democratic Party, while members of the Conservative Party, the Center
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party are categorized as rightwing.
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nious way to capture the main division in Swedish politics.13 Left-wing majority
councils auctioned 454 objects, right-wing majority councils 267.14
Table 2 describes the objects. The vast majority of them are schools or day-
care centers. The objects vary according to the characteristics we observe: size in
square meters (sizemi),  contract  length  (lengthmi), prolongation period (periodmi),
and required cleaning frequency (freqmi). The contract length is the stated contract
period and the prolongation period states the period that the contract can be ex-
tended with if the current holder of the contract has performed well after the con-
tract  period  has  expired.  The  prolongation  period  is  normally  one  or  two  years.
The cleaning frequency is the number of days during a year the object should be
cleaned.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The bidders in the procurements are Swedish cleaning service firms. There are
in total 322 firms in our data. They can be divided roughly into four categories.
First, there are 4 firms that operate nationally (“National”). This group includes
the largest, and some medium sized firms. For confidentiality reasons we have
labeled  these  national  firms  “Ns”, s = a, b, c, d. The largest national firms “Na”
and  “Nb”  submit  bids  for  most  objects,  whereas  “Nc”  and  “Nd”, two other na-
tional firms, submit bids for 6-10% of objects. Second, there are mid-size firms
that are active regionally (“Regional”). According to our classification, 70.5% of
the firms are regional. The third group consists of small local firms that only bid
in one or a couple of municipalities (“Local”). The local firms constitute 27.5% of
the firms in the sample. The final group consists of firms that used to be the clean-
13 E.g. Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000, pp. 192) write: “These two variables [based on
council decomposition into leftwing (socialist) and rightwing (non-socialist)] are assumed to con-
trol for the widespread belief that socialists and non-socialists usually have different views about
public spending and that a fragmented parliament might find it hard to hold back public spending.”
12
ing department of a municipality, but have at some point been transformed into a
company that still is owned by the municipality (“In-house production”). An in-
house municipal production unit participates in bidding for almost 40% of objects.
 [TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 describes the bidding level data for the estimation sample. It shows
that bids are on average 160 Swedish krona per sq.m. (circa 15€/sq.m.). Almost
three fifths of the bids (58%) were submitted in auctions with open entry (catego-
rized as open or simplified). The table also shows that most of our data (88%) is
from years (1994-1998) when the Public Procurement Act was in force. Regional
firms submit most of the bids (41%), followed by the few national firms (30%)
and local firms (21%). Inhouse firms submit 8% of the bids.
On average, there were 7.45 bidders in the auctions. For almost 58% of the
721 objects, the municipalities did not choose the lowest bid. Moreover, some
municipalities never award an object to the lowest bidder. Conditional on the low-
est bid not winning, the average difference between the winning and lowest bid is
42.9%.15 The raw correlation between the lowest bid not winning and the number
of entrants (bids) is 0.17 (significant at 5% level).16
14 In our estimation sample we have 56 municipalities who organized at least one procurement (3
drop from our data for availability reasons). 21 of them had a left-wing majority.
15 Over all objects/auctions, the average difference between the winning and lowest bids is 24.7%.
16 The lowest bid won in 51% of open entry auctions, and only in 25% of auctions with restricted
entry. The correlation is entirely due to left-wing councils (correlation 0.30 and significant at 5%
level), as the correlation is only 0.06 (insignificant at 5% level) in right-wing councils. This indi-
cates that not choosing the lowest bid is positively correlated with the number of bids in the left-
wing municipalities.
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3 Municipal decisions on procurement
organization
In this section, we study who procures, what types of auctions are organized (open
or restricted entry), and how many (and which) firms are invited. To study these
questions, we use the sharp regression discontinuity (RD) approach discussed e.g.
in Lee (2008). Due to our limited sample size, we use parametric approach and are
conservative in giving causal interpretations to our results. We report results based
on  2nd,  3rd and  4th order polynomials (of left-wing share of municipal council
seats) of the forcing variable, where we have always included interactions be-
tween the left-wing majority indicator and the polynomial terms.17
The key variable of interest is redm which allows us to identify the (causal)
effect  of  political  partisanship  on  the  outcomes.  We have  executed  the  test  pro-
posed by Lee and Lemieux (2007, Section 4.4.2) on whether our data fulfills the
RD requirements.  The  p-values  of  the  test,  reported  in  Table  4,  indicate  that  for
the “who procures?” question, the test  does not reject  the null  hypothesis of our
data fulfilling the RD requirements.18 For the other two samples, the null hypothe-
sis is however rejected and the results therefore have to be interpreted with cau-
tion.
In Column 1 of Table 4, we report the results of a Logit regression in which
the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one for those municipalities
that reported to have organized at least one procurement auction and is zero oth-
erwise.  The  raw data  reveals  that  only  a  minority  of  the  municipalities  used  the
17 We have checked the robustness of the results to (not) including municipal characteristics as
controls, and by estimating the models using a linear probability model. As the results from the
LPM estimations are mostly in line with those reported, we omit them for brevity.
18 The sample varies over these three questions: for the who procures question, the sample consists
of 226 Swedish municipalities. For the question on type of entry, the sample consists of 130 pro-
14
option: Only 26% (59/229) of the municipalities in the data organized at least one
procurement auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. The results show that
the propensity to procure cleaning services is not correlated with the political
identity of the governing party. This is not in line with the view that left-wing
municipalities are systematically against market-orientation, nor with the avail-
able Swedish evidence which suggests that the left-wing Swedish municipalities
prefer larger public sector (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). If one believes that this sort
of political thinking characterizes Swedish municipalities with left-wing majority
councils, it is a bit surprising that the preference does not result in a reduced like-
lihood to procure in our data.
In Column 2 of Table 4 we report the results of a Logit regression in which
the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one for those procurements
that had an open entry and is zero otherwise. From the raw data (Table 1) we
know that entry was restricted in 30% of the cases. Out of the 21 (35) left-wing
(right-wing) majority councils, 16 (24) organized only open entry procurements, 5
(7) only restricted entry procurements, and none (4) both used both entry formats.
The results show that the political identity of the governing party is not correlated
with organizing an auction with restricted entry.
The question of how many firms get invited to an auction with a restricted
entry is addressed in Columns 3 of Table 4. The raw data shows that in auctions
with restricted entry, there are 7.8 (5.9) bidders on average if the municipality has
right-wing (left-wing) council. The difference is statistically significant (t-value
2.7).19 There is more variation in the participation rates of local and in-house
firms in auctions with restricted entry. We report results for a count (Poisson) re-
curements. Finally, for the question of how many firms get invited, the sample consists of 314
auctions (objects for which services were procured).
15
gression in which the dependent variable is the number of invited firms. There are
314 objects in the estimation sample.20 Using a 2nd and a 3rd order polynomial of
the forcing variable we find that conditional on organizing an auction with re-
stricted entry, left-wing majority councils invite fewer firms.21 The point estimate
is large in absolute value, implying a large impact of political partisanship. This
result is not robust to using a 4th order polynomial, as the obtained coefficient (see
Row 3) is negative, but statistically insignificant. Given the small sample size, we
decided to experiment with orthonormalizing the polynomial terms (and then in-
teracting them with the indicator variable of interest). With orthonormalization,
the 4th order polynomial results are in line with the 2nd and 3rd order results. Given
this, we view our results as giving moderate evidence that left-wing majority
councils invite fewer firms to bid, conditional on organizing a restricted entry
auction.
All these results are robust to including municipal characteristics (unempm,
populm, popdensm, incomem, highedum) as controls.22 However, as mentioned
above, for the type of entry and number of invited firms estimations, the Lee and
Lemieux  (2007)  test  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  our  data  fulfills  the  RD  re-
quirements. One should therefore interpret these results with caution.
 [TABLE 4 HERE]
19 As for the identity of the invited bidders, regional and national firms are nearly always invited:
Their participation rates are 99.0% and 98.4%, respectively.
20 There are 24 restricted entry procurements and 15 negotiated procurements (both thus not hav-
ing free entry). In these 39 procurements, 314 objects were procured. The number of invited firms
varies within a procurement (i.e., over objects), making an object level analysis meaningful.
21 We have also run a Poisson regression in which we control for the number and type of contracts
(objects). The qualitative results on the role of the political identity of the governing party did not
change.
22 For the who procures estimations, these were measured in 1990; for the type of entry and num-
ber of invited firms estimations, these were measured in the year of the procurement. For the latter
two estimations, we also added a year dummy to the control vector.
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4 Modeling the choice of the winning bid
Our main research question focuses on the determinants of the choice of the win-
ning bid(der). Raw data shows that in right-wing (left-wing) councils, the prob-
ability of the lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%). The difference is signifi-
cant at 1% level. Conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the winning bid is on
average 46.5% (35.2%) higher than the lowest bid in the right-wing (left-wing)
municipalities. This difference is however insignificant. These numbers and tests
suggest that rightwing councils award the contract more often to a bidder other
than the lowest but conditional on doing so, they do not pay on average a larger
premium over the lowest bid.
To study the choice of the winning bid in greater detail, we adopt the ran-
dom utility model (McFadden 1974). We specify it to allow for the possibility that
the lowest bid does not win because the municipalities care for political reasons
about bid(der) attributes other than price.23
4.1 Econometric framework
To derive an econometric framework for our analysis, let the municipalities be
indexed by m, 1,...,m M= , objects to be cleaned by i, 1,..., mi I= , and bidders
(firms) by j, 1,..., mij J= . The indirect utility of municipality m from choosing
bidder j to clean object i is:
1 2( )mij mi m mij mij mijU red bid qy h h e= - + ´ ´ + + , (1)
where miy  refers to the additively separable effects of munici-
pal/procurement/object characteristics, mijbid  to the bid (price) of firm j for object
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i in municipality m (in 10 000 kronor per square meter), mijq  to ‘quality’, and mije
to an error term.
The municipal/procurement/object characteristics, miy , reflect the mean
utility that municipality m obtains when it has its premises cleaned and the object-
specific deviations from the mean. It thus captures all additively separable effects
of observable and unobservable municipal characteristics on municipal utility,
e.g., regional structure, demographics, income distribution, voter preferences, and
propensity to procure services. The term also refers to (un)observable object char-
acteristics, such as the type, size, location, etc. of the object. It captures differ-
ences in the indirect utility derived, e.g., from having a clean health center as
compared to having clean sports facilities. The assumed additive separability of
these  effects  and  the  distributional  (logit)  assumption  on  the  error  term (see  be-
low) allow us to condition all these effects out in the estimation. As miy  also con-
trols for voter preferences (the role of the polynomial in the regression discontinu-
ity specifications estimated above), we do not need to include the polynomial of
the composition of the council.24
The second term in (1), 1 2( )m mijred bidh h+ ´ ´ ,  specifies  the  effect  of  a
submitted bid on the choice, with 1 2 mredh h+ ´  measuring the weight given to the
bid. The weight is a function of the political ideology of the local government,
allowing us to test whether the weight depends on the political ideology. One rea-
son to test for this is that “bid preference programs” may explain the data. These
programs award a contract to the lowest preferred bidder, provided that its bid is
23 An example is the locality of the firm, if the local politicians care about the firm’s profits. Other
such positive externalities include income taxes and employment (see Vagstad 1995).
24 The term controls in addition for the additively separable effects on the utility of those charac-
teristics of the procurement event that do not vary over the bidding firms, such as whether or not
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close enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidders (e.g., McAfee and
McMillan 1989, Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2006, Marion 2007). These programs
give some firms preferential treatment, often because it is considered to be politi-
cally desirable.
The third term in (1), mijq , refers to quality and is included because munici-
palities may have resorted to a scoring auction, which balances the quality of the
bid(der) and price, or a to “beauty contest”, in which no scoring rule is announced
(Che 1993, Asker and Cantillon 2006).25 In principle, we could write the quality
term as 1 2mij mij mjq q qº + , where
1
mijq  allows for the possibility that municipalities
care about the quality of cleaning of a particular object for which firms are bid-
ding (i.e., ex ante object-level quality differences) and where 2mjq  captures the
possibility that there are firm-specific, as opposed to object-specific, quality dif-
ferences (i.e., ex ante corporate-level quality differences).
The extensive documentation available to us on the technical specifications
of  the  procurements  and  the  specifics  of  the  bids  however  suggest  strongly  that
1 0mijq º , i.e., that there are no ex ante quality differences at the object-level. That
is,  conditional  on  the  corporate  identity  of  the  bidders,  there  are  no  ex  ante  dis-
cernible quality differences between the bids for a specific object. The most com-
pelling support for this claim is provided by the technical specifications of the
procurement instructions. We obtained the procurement instructions of all the
objects (premises) in the data. These are in general very detailed - an example of a
typical technical specification can be found in Appendix A. Besides including a
entry  to  the  auction  was  open and whether  or  not  the  object  was  auctioned as  a  part  of  a  multi-
object procurement.
25 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement. They
stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and con-
tractual design incomplete.
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detailed description of the premises to be cleaned, the frequency of cleaning,
cleaning method, cleaning substances that are preferred, and cleaning equipment
that is to be employed, they also go into much more minute detail.26 In addition,
the submitted bids reveal that firms almost without exception only detail i) the
object for which the firm is bidding, ii) the name and contact information of the
bidder, iii) and the price, despite the forms providing space for additional informa-
tion (see Appendix A for an example of a typical bid). If such information is pro-
vided, it is invariably uninformative as to potential quality differences.27  Further
supporting evidence comes from interviews that we conducted and especially the
type of service we are studying.28
Even if there are no object-level differences in the quality of the bids, there
may have been corporate-specific quality differences (i.e., 2mjq ¹ 0). Indeed, the
only piece of information in the bids in which the firms were able to ‘differentiate
26 For example, it is common to state requirements as to the professional education of cleaning
staff to be used. Similarly, the monitoring of cleaning is often specified in detail, and it is standard
to require the firm to inform the municipality on several features of the working process, to pro-
vide records of hours of work, workforce and machinery employed etc.. As if this wasn’t enough,
in several instances the procurement instructions go into great detail as to how each space (e.g.
classroom, toilet) is to be cleaned. All this suggests that it is very hard to differentiate one-self
quality-wise.
27 A typical piece of extra information is that the firm j plans to use certain substance S in cleaning,
say, school i. The procurement instructions however always dictate in detail the environmental
aspects of the substances to be used, and the extra information provided by firm j is that substance
S fulfills these criteria. This also suggests that the firms were not able to differentiate themselves
quality-wise in the bids.
28 We interviewed a (former) civil servant who used to be in charge of public procurement, and
three industry representatives. While the former civil servant maintained that local firms provide
higher quality through better local presence, he also mentioned a nationally operating firm as pro-
viding similar quality. The three firm representatives were unanimous in stating that all firms pro-
vide equal quality in public procurements. (One of them, a local operator, maintained that they
provide higher quality in private procurement.). They also mentioned that procurement instruc-
tions in public procurement are so well-defined that there is no room for (large) quality-
differences. Our final support for the claim of no quality differences at the object-level is based on
the type of service we are studying. The literature on the relative merit of negotiation versus auc-
tions (e.g. Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003 and the literature cited therein) is - for good reasons
- mainly interested in “customized goods such as new buildings, fighter jets or consulting ser-
vices” (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003, pp. 1). We take a completely opposite track by study-
ing internal cleaning services. Our, admittedly layperson view of (good or bad) cleaning is that
“you cannot describe it, but you know it when you see it”. Cleaning is a labor-intensive, low-tech
service, the quality of which is easily monitored, for which the requisite skills are relatively easily
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themselves’ (besides the price) is the corporate identity of the bidder. To capture
this, we include firm fixed effects.29
The last term in (1), mije , is a stochastic error term that captures intrinsic
randomness in municipality decision making. It allows for idiosyncrasies deci-
sion-making that resulted every now and then in the lowest bidder not winning.
These idiosyncrasies may have been driven in part by lack of established pro-
curement practices and by the flexible legislative procurement framework of the
1990s. We assume that mije was unobservable to bidders and distributed i.i.d. type
I extreme value.
Given the above assumptions, the probability that bidder w wins in a pro-
curement auction for object i organized by municipality m is (McFadden 1974):
{ }
{ }
2
1 2
2
1 21
exp ( )
Pr[ ]
exp ( )mi
m miw mw
mi J
m mij mjj
red bid q
y w
red bid q
h h
h h
=
- + ´ ´ +
= =
- + ´ ´ +å
 (2)
As specified, the model corresponds to the standard conditional/mixed logit model
and can be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML). The ML estimation assumes
that the bids are exogenous, and as we report below, the exogeneity of bids can be
tested and is not rejected by the data.
acquired and are wide-spread, and cleaning services is an industry in which barriers to entry are
relatively low.
29 It is worth point out two things about this specification: First, the econometric model already
conditions on miy , i.e., on the (direct) effects of municipal/procurement/object characteristics on
the indirect utility. Second, when jkX  includes firm (type) dummies, 0k jkXa  captures fixed firm
(firm type) characteristics. These terms control for the effect on choice of permanent quality dif-
ferences between firms that are valued similarly by all municipalities. Together with the bids,
these terms thus allow controlling e.g. for the presence of a bid/price preference program in which
all municipalities run a similar, biased procurement auction that award contracts to the lowest
preferred bidders (say, to local firms), provided that their bids are close enough to the lowest bid
of the non-preferred bidder.
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4.2 Empirical results
Main results
Table 5 displays the estimation results. Of central interest is the coefficient of
m mijred bid´ . In column (1), the regressors include mijbid  and m mijred bid´  only.
For column (2), we additionally include the three firm type -dummies. In column
(3), we replicate the estimations of column (2), except that we add dummies for
all firms with at least 20 bids (the results are robust to using a lower cutoff; see
the robustness tests).30 These dummies allow for firm-specific deviations from the
firm-type  dummies.  Each  column  displays  the  results  of  Wald-tests  for  the  null
hypotheses that the sum of the coefficients of the bid variables is zero.
As  the  table  shows,  both  the  bid’s  and  bid-left  wing  majority  interaction’s
coefficients are always negative and significant and the weight put on price varies
with political ideology: Leftwing municipalities put much more weight on the
bids and the increase in the weight is always statistically significant. The first re-
sult suggests the municipalities do not ignore price when deciding whom to award
the contract. This is a somewhat surprising finding, because in the raw data, the
lowest bid wins rarely (less than half of the time) and the price difference between
the lowest and winning bid is large (despite the negligible differences in service
quality). The second result suggests that while all councils are price sensitive,31
the councils with a left-wing majority are 1.5 times as price sensitive as the right-
wing councils. This result is robust across the columns. Both the firm type dum-
mies and the firm fixed effects are jointly significant. The data thus support the
largest specification, reported in column (3). We have tested whether the firm type
30 There are 322 firms in the sample, some of which only have a few bids.
31 Note that in a conditional logit, one cannot calculate marginal effects.
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dummies should be interacted with redm but the data suggests not as the interac-
tions are jointly insignificant in all specifications.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Robustness tests
We have explored the robustness of our results in five ways. Taking each of them
in turn:
First, one might be worried that bids are endogenous for various reasons.
We (see Appendix B for details) have explored this, using the control function
approach of Petrin and Train (2005, 2006). As reported in Table 5, while the Null
hypothesis of no endogeneity is rejected in some specifications, this result is not
robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Our reading of these results is that we
have no firm evidence of endogeneity of bids.
The second concern to address is that the multi-object nature of the data
may explain the observed behavior. In many instances, a municipality procured
cleaning services for several premises simultaneously. To minimize immediate
procurement costs, the municipalities should have awarded each contract to the
lowest bidder. In a multi-object context such a procedure may however be a
source of inefficiency (e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu 2003). The municipalities may
thus have taken an aggregate of the bids into account, even if the rules instructed
the firms to submit bids object-by-object and the municipalities to make decisions
object-by-object. To test whether the aggregate bid matter for the choice (there are
no combinatorial bids in the data), we include two new regressors to the choice
model: The first is mijavgbid , computed as the weighted average bid (10 000 kro-
nor/sq.m.) of firm j (weighted by object size) that it submitted for the objects that
were auctioned simultaneously with object i. The second is mijrat , defined as the
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fraction of objects for which firm j submitted a bid (also measured using sq.m.) in
the procurement in which object i was auctioned. The underlying assumption is
that, after having conditioned out additively separable multi-object features that
are constant over firms within an object and a procurement, the weighted average
of the submitted bids is a proxy for the multi-object characteristic that the munici-
palities care about when making the award decision.
The results (not reported) show that the inclusion of these two new regres-
sors does not change our main findings. For example, the coefficients of redm and
redm*bidmij are now -177 and -113. We find some evidence that the municipalities
have taken the aggregate of the bids into account, as mijavgbid  obtains a negative
(-5.502) and highly significant coefficient (p-value < 0.01).
For our third robustness check we change the way the firm fixed effects are
controlled for in the basic estimation. Instead of including firm dummies for all
the bidders who have more than 20 bids in the sample, we estimate the model
(with exogenous bids) using 15 bids as the threshold.32 There are no major
changes in the qualitative results. The coefficients of redm and redm*bidmij are now
-196 and -163. While the latter point estimate is clearly smaller than that reported
in Column (3) of Table 5, it is within two standard errors (38) of the redm*bidmij
coefficient in Column (3).
The fourth robustness check considers the effects of fly-by-night firms who
bid (very) low but are known to provide (very) poor quality, leading to munici-
palities not choosing the lowest bid. We test for the presence of such firms by
excluding from the sample all objects for which the difference (in percentage
terms) between the lowest and 2nd lowest bid is in the 95th percentile. Re-
32 There are 172 firms with less than 10 bids; of these, 92 have 1 bid, 32 2 bids, 10 3 bids, 13 4
bids, and 25 5-9 bids.
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estimating the conditional logit model(s) reproduces the results reported above in
Table 5 with minor quantitative changes: The coefficients of redm and redm*bidmij
are now -199 and -96 and within a standard deviation of our results in Column (4)
of Table 5.
Finally, we estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is
whether or not the lowest bid wins and the explanatory variables are the differ-
ence between the lowest and 2nd lowest bid, an interaction of this difference with
redm, and all five municipality characteristics. This estimation echoes our earlier
findings about the price sensitivity of political parties: The larger the difference,
the  more  likely  that  the  lowest  bid  wins.  The  effect  is  not  significant  for  right-
wing majority councils (coeff. 6.212, p-value 0.875) but is highly significant in
councils with a left-wing majority (coeff. 292.012, p-value 0.000).
5 Discussion
At the first glance, one might think that our two main empirical findings – that
left-wing majority councils seem to invite fewer firms conditional on organizing a
restricted entry auction, and that they are more price-sensitive – are at odds with
each other. The latter suggests that left-wing majority councils are more aggres-
sive procurers while the former can be interpreted to suggest that they are at the
same time more selective in which firms to invite (conditional on having restricted
entry) and thus more accommodating towards the bidders.
A challenge in giving our results a structural interpretation is that in models
of imperfect information, a given causal effect may mask different structural in-
terpretations. One of the possible interpretations of our results and the one we put
tentatively forth is that right-wing majority councils are more pro-competition
than left-wing majority councils. This would be the case if the cleaning service
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procurement auctions were independent private value auctions with exogenous
entry. One could then interpret the finding that left-wing majority councils invite
fewer bidders as being anti-competition: Within the independent private value
paradigm, an increase in the exogenous number  of  bidders  typically  leads  to  an
increase in the competitiveness of the auction (whereas an endogenous increase in
the number of bidders due to selective entry may have a non-monotonous effect;
see Li and Zheng 2009 and the references therein).33 Similarly, resorting to papers
on favoritism in auctions (such as McAfee and McMillan 1989, Burguet and Che
2004, Vagstad 1995, and Rezende 2004), one could view the result that right-wing
majority councils are less price-sensitive as evidence for them being pro-
competition. The reason for this is that if the bidders are asymmetric, a pro-
competitive procurer may lower the expected winning bid if it explicitly favors
weaker bidders over the others. The non-favored bidders would as a consequence
bid more aggressively. Such an auctioneer would seem less price sensitive as she
would every once in a while choose some other but the lowest bid.
Verifying whether this, or some other similar explanation, is in line with the
data would necessitate structural modeling and a careful analysis of the informa-
tion regime and is beyond the scope of this paper.34 Let us however briefly outline
arguments for and against the above interpretation of our results. In favor is the
fact that we study cleaning services. This means that most of the uncertainty
(unlike, say, in oil drilling) emanates from firm specific cost shocks (like avail-
ability of personnel, distances to the premises etc.) rather than shocks common to
all bidders that would have to do with surprises in e.g. how many hours it takes to
33 In general, an increase in the exogenous number of bidders does not have to increase the com-
petitiveness of an auction (Pinkse and Tan 2005).
34 Notice that this is a situation often encountered in environments with imperfect information. It is
hence not specific to our analysis.
26
clean certain premises. This would suggest that the bidders may well operate in an
independent private value setting, as required for the above story to hold. The
following two-part argument speaks against our interpretation. First, if it really
was the case that right-wing majority councils were more pro-competition and
therefore resorted to favoritism, they could have practiced favoritism more explic-
itly  e.g.  by  using  scoring  rules.  In  our  perusal  of  the  documents,  we  however
found no trace of any explicit statements of favoritism. Second, favoritism could
have lead to bids being endogenous, of which we found little evidence in our em-
pirical analysis.
6 Conclusions
Does political representation affect how public spending is done and how are pub-
lic services procured? To address these questions, we have studied the organiza-
tion of public procurement of cleaning service contracts in Swedish municipali-
ties. These services are simple to contract on and, as we have shown, do not vary
much in quality. There are few, if any, compelling reasons to depart from standard
auction formats and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder
in this environment.
Our data come from a period when the EU (and thus Swedish) law allowed
the municipalities high degrees of freedom in designing and running procure-
ments. This institutional environment left a lot of room for discretion and may
thus explain the outcome we observe in our data: Conditional on deciding to or-
ganize a procurement auction, no municipality committed to a standard (price)
auction format of any kind, nor did they choose to have an explicit scoring rule.
Municipalities also exploited the freedom allowed by the law to invite bidders and
choose the winner: Left-wing majority councils seem to invite fewer bidders than
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right-wing majority councils, conditional on restricting entry. In our data, the low-
est bidder does not win 58% of the time, and the price difference between the
lowest and the winning bids is 43% despite us finding little evidence for differ-
ences in product quality. We none the less find that municipalities do take bids
(prices) into account in choosing whom to allocate the contract. Furthermore, the
weight put on price varies with political ideology, with left-wing majority coun-
cils being 1.5 times as price-sensitive as right-wing majority councils.
Taken together, our results suggest that politics both does and does not mat-
ter in procurement.  The decision to procure or not and the choice of entry mode
are not subject to political influence in our data. Given this, it is somewhat strik-
ing to find that politics matters at the very micro-level: the decision of how many
firms to invite seems to be correlated with the political orientation of municipali-
ties and their price elasticity when determining whose bids gets chosen is affected
by political partisanship.
These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and
provision of services: While the propensity to procure cleaning services is not
correlated with the political identity of the governing party, the design and espe-
cially award policies are. This finding casts doubt on the notion that market-
oriented procurement is less subject to political concerns than public (internal)
provision. This is a cause of concern, not least because political involvement may
reduce the amount of cost savings that can be obtained from using procurement
auctions (see Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz 2007 for evidence on the costs
differences between public and private units in the cleaning of Danish schools).
Our findings also point to the importance of understanding better political
incentives and how they shape the design of and award decisions in public pro-
curement auctions, especially in auctions in which the non-price attributes of
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bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the award decision. Why political
competition matters, how it affects procurement outcomes (e.g. firms’ bidding
strategies) and which kinds of public procurement are most affected by political
representation clearly warrant further analysis.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Allocation mechanism
Simplified Open Restricted Negotiated All
# procurements 60 32 24 15 131
# objects 129 315 255 59 758
Variable Statistic
# objects Mean 2.2 9.8 10.6 4.5 5.9
Stand. dev. 3.9 10.7 16.3 8.1 10.1
Maximum 27 37 74 29 74
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
# bids Mean 7.1 8.9 7.4 5.5 7.8
on each Stand. dev. 3.9 4.3 3.3 2.5 3.9
object Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
# bids Mean 6.1 8.1 7.8 6.3 6.9
in each Stand. dev. 4.6 5.4 4.0 4.9 4.8
procurement Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
Contract Mean 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
Maximum 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Minimum 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.2
Prolongation Mean 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Maximum 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Municipal characteristics (procurement level)
Red Mean 0.4 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.46
Stand. dev. 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.11
Maximum 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.67
Minimum 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.18
Density Mean 201.64 248.32 684.46 905.54 297.85
Stand. dev. 438.82 677.17 616.39 1252.11 611.00
Maximum 2808.02 13.96 2796.35 2749.69 2808.02
Minimum 4.60 4.58 60.54 24.20 4.60
Population Mean 70845.46 69600.58 61812.29 38548.64 65402.72
Stand. dev. 44.939.43 59363.74 19578.14 17305.05 44230.13
Maximum 188478 188478 118606 57427 188478
Minimum 10140 8710 26548 10795 8710
Unemployment Mean 7.92 8.53 7.24 7.32 7.89
Stand. dev. 2.12 2.02 1.98 1.99 2.23
Maximum 11.28 13.96 10.51 9.15 13.96
Minimum 1.94 4.58 3.95 1.76 1.76
Average income Mean 146.91 146.38 170.24 147.26 148.80
Stand. dev. 18.25 12.82 28.79 15.73 20.90
Maximum 197.00 177.50 217.80 189.4 217.80
Minimum 109.60 121.00 128.60 128.7 109.60
Higher education Mean 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08
Stand. dev. 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
Maximum 0.57 0.12 0.17 .016 0.57
Minimum 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
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Table 2.  Objects
Type Frequency Percent
Schools 319 42.1 757
Day care centers 302 39.9 757
Office 65 8.6 757
Medical health centers 27 3.6 757
Sport centers 16 2.1 757
Libraries 16 2.1 757
Others 12 1.6 757
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Table 3. Bid level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Bid/sq.m. Swedish krona (SEK) 160.242 94.088 11 2174
Open 0.419 0.494 0 1
Restricted 0.411 0.492 0 1
Negotiated 0.061 0.240 0 1
Simplified 0.169 0.375 0 1
Local 0.209 0.406 0 1
Regional 0.408 0.492 0 1
Inhouse 0.080 0.272 0 1
National 0.304 0.460 0 1
t91 0.003 0.056 0 1
t92 0.055 0.228 0 1
t93 0.055 0.228 0 1
t94 0.143 0.350 0 1
t95 0.419 0.493 0 1
t96 0.254 0.435 0 1
t97 0.099 0.298 0 1
t98 0.020 0.139 0 1
NOTES: Sample is 5374 bids submitted for the 721 objects used in the estimation.
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Table 4
Estimation Results
Variable (1)
To procure or not
(2)
Open entry
(3)
Number of firms |
restricted entry
redm
with 2nd order
9.960
(23.101)
-68.4447
(97.454)
-113.101
(22.329)
redm
with 3rd order
180.351
(233.094)
6646.845
(3536.913)
-43.314
(14.715)
redm
with 4th order
109.643
(221.188)
3514.375
(2806.311)
-434.930
(507.411)
redm
with 4th order, or-
thonormalized
22.551
(43.157)
-585.649
(1422.445)
-2259.361
(215.633)
RD test (p-value) 0.267 0.000 0.000
Nobs 226 130 314
NOTES: The numbers reported are the coefficients of redm and its standard error from specifica-
tions without controls. Method of estimation: Columns 1-2: Logit; Column 3: Poisson with clus-
tered standard errors. The sample consists in Column 1 of municipalities, in Column 2 of pro-
curements, and in Columns 3 of auctions (objects) with restricted entry. Significance levels: * p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. “RD test” refers to the p-value of the test proposed in section
4.4.2.of Lee and Lemieux (2007).
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Table 5
Results from conditional logit
Variable (1) (2) (3)
redm -165.050
(14.969)
-155.105
(14.913)
-204.271
(19.830)
redm*bidmij -130.542
(33.860)
-160.007
(35.594)
-92.497
(38.470)
LogL. -1203.095 -1061.017 -878.512
bid+redm*bid 0.000 0.000 0.000
redm*firm type dummies - 0.170 0.763
Endogeneity-test 0.002 0.014 0.164
Firm type dummies - 0.000 0.054
Firm fixed effects - - 0.000
Nobs. 5372 5372 5372
NOTES: The numbers reported are the coefficients and standard errors. Significance levels: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. “bid+redm*bid” refers to the p-value of a test of joint significance
of the coefficients of the bid and redm*bid variables; “redm*firm type dummies” refers to p-value
of a joint significance test on the firm type dummy - redm interactions; “Endogeneity” refers to p-
value of a joint test of the endogeneity of the bid-variables (see Appendix for details); “Firm type
dummies” refers to p-value of a joint significance test of the firm type dummies; and “Firm fixed
effects” refers to p-value of a joint significance test of the firm fixed effects.
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Appendix A. Procurement documents: contract notice, technical specifica-
tion, and bid.
Figure 1A. Example of typical contract notice.
“Quality monitoring: Documented quality
monitoring, with representatives from B
and E, should on the initiative from E take
place once a month.”
“Evaluation of tender/bid: Arvika Municipality will
accept the bid considered to be the most advantageous
economically with respect to price, quality,
competence, and seriousness. The evaluation criteria
are not ranked. Bids can be accepted without
negotiation.”
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Figure 2A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Mop with moped
“Mop with moped. Mop with moped. Conditions:
Mop with moped in easy to access spaces such as
gymnasiums and broad and long hallways.
Estimated time includes manual mop in difficult to
access spaces.”
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Figure 3A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Workroom:
M12 Dry mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M13 Wet mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M61Dust/wash furnishing and inventories 8,5 m2 Once a week
VX9 Empty waster-paper basket Five times a
week.
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Figure 4A. Example of typical bid.
Space for extra
information
Procuring
entity
The object for which firm j
is bidding
The bid in Swedish
kronor (SEK). Annual
price.
Identity of firm j and contact
information. The identity is
deleted due to that strict
confidence was assured when
the data was collected.
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Appendix B. Endogeneity of bids
The  estimations  presented  in  Table  5  of  the  main  text  assume  that  the  bids  are
exogenous, ruling out ‘favoritism’ that would affect the bids of the firms (i.e.,
favoritism that the firms are aware of when submitting their bids). Favoritism (or
even corruption) may however be present when the buyer has to delegate the or-
ganization of procurement auctions to an agent.1 In Burguet and Che (2004), for
example, the lowest bid does not always win because the procurement agent may
manipulate a dimension of the submitted bid to favor a high bidder in exchange
for a bribe (see also Laffont and Tirole 1991, Compte, Lambert and Verdier 2005,
and Menezes and Monteiro 2006). Because the Swedish procurement law allowed
the municipal procurement offices high degrees of freedom in choosing the win-
ner, the procurement offices may have found it relatively easy to manipulate a
dimension of the submitted bid (e.g., quality assessment) to favor a high bidder.2
This could lead to endogenous bids, because a firm who knows that it will be fa-
vored can bid higher and still expect to win.
To allow for favoritism and to test for the endogeneity of the bids, we aug-
ment the basic choice model with a favoritism term, mijf , to get
{ }
{ }
2
1 2
2
1 21
exp ( )
Pr[ ]
exp ( )mi
m miw mw miw
mi J
m mij mj miwj
red bid q f
y w
red bid q f
h h
h h
=
- + ´ ´ + +
= =
- + ´ ´ + +å
. (B.1)
This specification immediately shows that favoritism does not lead to endogenous
bids if there is no heterogeneity in how prone bidders are to look for favors (i.e. if
1 Sweden is regularly rated as one of the least corrupt societies. Yet, Transparency International
(2006) states that “The Nordic countries dominate the top scores in the 2006 Corruption Percep-
tions  Index  for  the  European  Union  and  other  Western  European  countries.  But  they  have  no
grounds for complacency as scandals in recent years have shown that there is sadly no such thing
as a corruption-free zone.”
2 Because the procurement officer could pick any bid, we can exclude ‘magic number favoritism’
wherein the corrupt procurement bureaucrat revises the bid of the favored bidder, or provides an
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mij mif fº ). The reason for this is that the econometric model conditions out such
additively separable effects. The same applies if there is no heterogeneity in the
vulnerability of the municipalities to favoritism (i.e. if mij jf fº ). The reason is
that the model we estimate conditions on the firm-type/fixed effects via term 2mjq .
The endogeneity of bids is thus a concern to us only if there are appropriate
‘matches’ in the data, i.e. if firms that look for a favor meet procurement officers
who are vulnerable to meet that demand.
Given (B.1), we can test for 0mijf =  using the control function method of
Petrin and Train (2005, 2006).3 Applying their method to (2) requires that munici-
palities’ ‘willingness to pay’ for a cleaning contract is increasing in the degree of
favoritism ( mijf ). This implies that firms who know that they will be favored can
bid higher and still expect to win. We implement the test as a Wald test, which
corresponds to a generalized method of moments over-identification test. We re-
cover a proxy, ˆ ˆmij mij mij mijf bid E bid Wé ù= - ë û , where mijW  includes all other factors
but mijf  that the firms take into account when submitting bids.
4 We estimate the
conditional expectation using cross-municipality variation in the bid data and in-
clude the proxy, mˆijf , directly into the random utility specification.
5
opportunity for this bidder to do so after all the other bids have been opened (see, e.g., Compte,
Lambert and Verdier 2005).
3 These papers consider characteristic-based discrete choice models of demand in a situation when
not all relevant product attributes are observed by the econometrician. In that set-up, the price of
the product can be correlated with the unobserved part of consumers’ utility. This is likely, if con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for product is increasing in the unobserved product attribute. The anal-
ogy of this to our approach is immediate.
4 Assuming that firms increase their bids when they expect to get a favor, the bids are monotoni-
cally increasing in mijf .  This implies that the bids are a function of the unobserved attribute and
that they are invertible in it.
5 To generate an instrument for the bid of firm j for object i in municipality m, we regress the bids
on municipality and object characteristics and firm dummies excluding all bids in municipality m.
We then predict how firm j would bid for object i in municipality m to obtain a Hausman-type
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The results of the Wald-tests for the null hypotheses of the exogeneity of the
bids are reported at the bottom of Table 5 in the main text. While the p-values for
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of no endoge-
neity for municipalities with a left-wing majority, the Wald-tests show that once
firm fixed effects are allowed, the bids are not endogenous (see column (3)). This
finding  is  consistent  with  the  result  of  Bandiera,  Pratt  and  Valletti  (2007),  who
find that most of the waste in their data on Italian procurement is “passive” (bad
decisions) rather than “active” (generating utility to the procurer).
instrument for bid (price). By assumption, the instrument is independent of the vulnerability of
municipality m to favoritism. Using the entire sample of bids, we then recover the expect bid func-
tion by regressing the bids on municipality and object characteristics, firm dummies, and the in-
strument. Finally, we compute the proxy, include it in the utility specification (interacted with
mred ) and test whether the parameters on the proxy are significant. The 1st stage p-values for our
instruments are 0.07 in the bid equation.
